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Since the 1970s, the out-of-wedlock birthrate has been increasing rapidly in the United States
and has prompted several states to propose (and in some cases, enact) legislation to deny access to
higher AFDC benefits for families in which the mother gives birth while receiving AFDC. The
authors investigate whether AFDC benefit levels are systematically related to the family-size decisions
of never-married women. Using a Poisson regression model, applied to Current Population Survey
data for the years 1980–1988, they find that the basic benefit level positively influences family size for
white and Hispanic women, but not for black women. Incremental benefits for larger families,
however, do not affect family-size decisions, suggesting that reducing (or eliminating) this differential
will not necessarily reduce the number of illegitimate births. The basic benefit level positively affects
the family-size decisions of high school dropouts, but not of high school graduates. This suggests that
to discourage nonmarital births, policymakers should consider altering the AFDC benefit structure in
such a way as to encourage single mothers to complete high school. However, being a high school
dropout might be a proxy for some other underlying characteristic of the woman, and inducing women
to complete high school who otherwise would not might have no effect whatsoever on nonmarital
births.Welfare Benefits and Family-Size
Decisions of Never-Married Women
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the entire post–World War II period, the birthrate among unmarried women has increased
tremendously. In 1950, there were approximately fourteen live births per thousand unmarried women.
By 1989, this figure had tripled, to forty-two live births per thousand (see Figure 1). Except for a
slight decline between 1970 and 1975, the upward trend in the rate of illegitimate births has continued
unabated, and has even accelerated since 1975.
The rise in out-of-wedlock births is the result of two underlying phenomena. First, the
birthrate among unmarried white women almost quintupled during this period, from six births per
thousand in 1950 to twenty-nine births per thousand in 1989. Second, black women, who have a
much higher birthrate than white women, have been constituting an ever increasing proportion of the
total population of unmarried women. In 1970, black women constituted 15 percent of the population
of unmarried women; by 1989, they constituted 20 percent. Interestingly, the birthrate among
unmarried black women fell considerably between 1970 and 1984 (from ninety-six live births to
seventy-seven), but since 1984, it has been increasing like the white rate and has almost returned to its
1970 level.
1
Many casual observers have asserted that the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program encourages out-of-wedlock childbearing because AFDC guarantee levels increase
with family size. As indicated in Table 1, the average (unweighted) monthly guarantee level in the
United States in 1991 for a four-person family (parent and three children) was roughly 45 percent
higher than the average guarantee level for a two-person family ($463 versus $320).
2 The average
differential has fallen by more than 40 percent in real terms since the late 1960s, mirroring the decline
in average guarantee levels.2
Figure 1 here3
TABLE 1
Average Monthly AFDC Guarantee Levels, by Number of Children: 1968–1991
Average Differential between Benefit
Number of Children for Family with One Child and Benefit
Year 1 2 3 for Family with Three Children
1968 $516 $641 $767 $126
1969 521 641 761 120
1970 515 638 762 124
1971 514 635 756 121
1972 510 631 749 120
1973 501 616 731 115
1974 498 608 718 110
1975 480 595 703 112
1976 472 587 694 111
1977 462 572 676 107
1978 452 560 662 105
1979 425 521 618 97
1980 374 459 544 85
1981 361 449 530 85
1982 345 427 504 80
1983 349 430 507 79
1984 337 414 490 77
1985 341 420 497 78
1986 355 436 514 80
1987 348 428 505 79
1988 346 424 499 77
1989 336 413 487 76
1990 326 401 472 73
1991 320 393 463 72
Sources: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on
Ways and Means, Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., various years, and private communications from
Evelyn Mills, Department of Health and Human Services, Family Support Administration.
Note: Unweighted average guarantees across states, 1991 dollars, deflated using the Consumer Price
Index.4
Guarantee differentials by family size vary considerably across the states, ranging from a 22
percent average differential in Wyoming to a 70 percent average differential in Louisiana (see Table
2). The change in the differential over time also has varied considerably across states, ranging from a
$200 real decline in Florida to a $7 real increase in Hawaii.
Although it has been argued that the scaling of AFDC benefits with family size fosters
childbearing (Murray, 1984, 1993), the logic behind the family-size differentials is based on the notion
that larger families are more costly to support than smaller families.
3 Nevertheless, the fact that there
is a family-size differential, together with the fact that the out-of-wedlock birthrate has been increasing
rapidly since the mid-1970s, has prompted several states to propose (and in some cases, enact)
legislation to deny access to higher AFDC benefits for families in which the mother gives birth while
receiving AFDC.
4 The purpose of such legislation is apparently to discourage out-of-wedlock
childbearing among AFDC recipients and to correspondingly reduce the costs of the AFDC program.
This rationale is somewhat curious given the real decline in benefit differentials over time. It may be
that the desire is to reduce the rate of increase of nonmarital births, which are due primarily to
noneconomic factors. It is also possible that such legislation is meant to be simply symbolic, sending
a signal to the public that out-of-wedlock childbearing is socially undesirable.
Although it has been asserted that denying benefit increases for additional children will
discourage out-of-wedlock childbearing (or at least slow it down), the empirical validity and
quantitative importance of this hypothesis have not been adequately tested. Many studies have
examined the relationship between benefit levels and family size, but few studies have examined the
relationship between benefit differentials and family size. The purpose of this paper is to investigate
whether both AFDC benefit levels and differentials are systematically related to the family-size
decisions of never-married women.5
TABLE 2
AFDC Monthly Guarantee Differentials by Family Size in 1991 and Change from 1968
(1991 Dollars)
Guarantee Guarantee Average Change in the
Level Level Differential Average
1 Child 3 Children Per Child Differential
State 1991 1991 1991 1968–1991
Alabama $93 $155 $31 $-28
Alaska 792 990 99 -58
Arizona 233 353 60 -46
Arkansas 162 247 43 3
California 560 824 132 -11
Colorado 280 432 76 -47
Connecticut 549 792 122 -131
Delaware 270 407 69 -53
District of Columbia 336 522 93 -32
Florida 225 346 61 -202
Georgia 235 330 48 -66
Hawaii 504 760 128 7
Idaho 254 357 52 -58
Illinois 268 414 73 -84
Indiana 229 346 59 -39
Iowa 361 495 67 -113
Kansas 338 470 66 -96
Kentucky 196 285 45 -104
Louisiana 138 234 48 -22
Maine 337 569 116 4
Maryland 317 489 86 -29
Massachusetts 446 628 91 -97
Michigan 429 635 103 -40
Minnesota 437 621 92 -84
Mississippi 96 144 24 -11
Missouri 234 342 54 -40
Montana 295 445 75 -109
Nebraska 293 435 71 -46
Nevada 270 390 60 -77
New Hampshire 451 575 62 -40
New Jersey 322 488 83 -111
New Mexico 247 373 63 -56
New York 468 687 110 -102
(table continues)6
TABLE 2, continued
Guarantee Guarantee Average Change in the
Level Level Differential Average
1 Child 3 Children Per Child Differential
State 1991 1991 1991 1968–1991
North Carolina 236 297 31 -22
North Dakota 326 491 83 -72
Ohio 274 413 70 -9
Oklahoma 264 423 80 -28
Oregon 380 541 81 -82
Pennsylvania 330 514 92 -49
Rhode Island 449 632 92 -49
South Carolina 167 252 43 -40
South Dakota 340 429 45 -89
Tennessee 150 238 44 -15
Texas 158 221 32 -51
Utah 323 470 74 -18
Vermont 571 762 96 -61
Virginia 294 410 58 -46
Washington 428 624 98 -31
West Virginia 201 312 56 -50
Wisconsin 440 617 89 -48
Wyoming 320 390 35 -37
U.S. average 320 463 72 -54
Sources: Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on
Ways and Means, Washington, D.C., U.S.G.P.O., 1991, and private communications from Evelyn
Mills, Department of Health and Human Services, Family Support Administration.7
II. PAST STUDIES
The empirical basis for the argument that welfare programs increase fertility and illegitimacy
dates back to Becker (1960), who developed a cost-benefit model for evaluating fertility decisions (see
also Becker [1981] and Fuchs [1983]). Increases in the illegitimacy rate have stimulated numerous
empirical studies to determine if the AFDC program, which lowers the cost of bearing an out-of-
wedlock child, has an effect on childbearing. Table 3 contains a summary of several of the more
prominent studies, dating back to 1970.
5
In general, the studies can be classified into two groups: macro studies that use aggregate
data from states or cities, and micro studies that use data on individuals. The early macro studies
(Cutright, 1970; Winegarden, 1974) did not find any effect of AFDC benefits on fertility rates,
possibly because they used small samples. Cutright only used twenty state observations, while
Winegarden used fifty-one. However, studies by Janowitz (1976) and Southwick (1978) also used
small samples (seventy-one SMSA and thirty-one state observations, respectively) and found that
AFDC benefits have a significant effect on the percentage of AFDC families with illegitimate children.
Unfortunately, one cannot draw any conclusions from these two studies because Janowitz found a
positive effect and Southwick found a negative effect. Freshcock and Cutright (1979), using almost
eight hundred observations from Statistical Areal Units, found that AFDC benefit levels have no effect
on the teenage out-of-wedlock birthrate; however, they found that benefit levels positively affect the
out-of-wedlock birthrate of white adult females and negatively affect the out-of-wedlock birthrate of
black adult females. Three additional macro studies from the 1980s also yielded mixed results. Using
state data from 1960 to 1980, Bernstam and Swan (1986) found a negative effect on the illegitimacy
rate, yet Winegarden (1988), using Granger causation on annual time-series data from 1947 to 1983,
found a positive effect for nonwhites. Hyatt and Milne (1991) used time-series data
(text continues on p. 13)8
TABLE 3
Studies of the Effect of Welfare on Childbearing Decisions
Estimation
Study Data Set Unit of Observation Dependent Variables Independent Variables Technique Results
Cutright 1950–66 States (n=20) Illegitimacy Annual AFDC benefit Cross-tabs No effect
(1970) NCHS rates per recipient
Placek & 1972 AFDC Welfare mothers, The notion that welfare Participation Cross-tabs No effect
Hendershot payees aged 15–44 mothers (1) favor welfare in AFDC
(1974) in Tennessee (n=300) status, (2) are extremely
active sexually, (3) don’t
use contraceptives, and
(4) want to become
pregnant
Polgar & 1965–67 Married women with Additional births in Participation Cross-tabs No effect
Hiday NORC-NY kids and single given period in AFDC
(1974) parents, aged 18–39
(n=304)
Winegarden 1967 DHEW States (n=51) Number of recipient (1) AFDC benefit level 2SLS No effect
(1974) children aged 0–1 per for one adult and three
100 AFDC mothers children
(2) Increment to the No effect
grant for a three-child
family relative to a
one-child family
Presser & 1970–72 Women with recent Desire to have more Participation in AFDC Cross-tabs Negative





Study Data Set Unit of Observation Dependent Variables Independent Variables Technique Results
Janowitz 1968 DHEW SMSAs (n=71) Illegitimate birth rate Welfare payment for a OLS Positive
(1976) and other U.S. per 1,000 unmarried one-parent, one-child significant
government women, by age group family effect for
sources young
nonwhites
Southwick 1973 DHEW States (n=31) Percentage of AFDC AFDC guarantee level OLS Negative
(1978) families with for a mother and three significant
illegitimate children children effect
Freshcock 1969 SAUs (n=778) Illegitimate births Maximum AFDC benefit OLS No effect
& Cutright U.S. Census per 1,000 women, by in late 1967 in the for
(1979) age group appropriate state, teenagers,
divided by mean size positive







Keefe 1970–71 Women on AFDC Whether or not mother (1) Basic welfare Logit No effects
(1983) AL-CA (n=3,155) in sample AFDC case benefit, and
became pregnant and (2) marginal benefit





Study Data Set Unit of Observation Dependent Variables Independent Variables Technique Results
Ellwood 1976 SIE Unmarried women Had a child in last AFDC benefit for one OLS No effect
& Bane (n=1,094 to 24,228) year adult and three
(1985) children
Bernstam & 1960–80 States (n=500) Illegitimacy rate AFDC benefit level OLS Negative
Swan (1986) DHHS and for one adult and effect
other U.S. three children
government
sources
Winegarden 1947–83 Time-series (n=37) Proportion of all births Net gain for average Granger Positive
(1988) DHHS and occurring out of wedlock, adult female participant causation significant
other U.S. by race effect for
government nonwhites
sources
Gonul 1979–83 Females aged 14–22 Marital status, work status, Basic AFDC guarantee Stepwise Weak
(1988) NLSY without multiple and fertility status level hazard positive
births (n=1,407) function effect
Plotnick 1979–84 Unmarried, childless (1) Probability of having an Five indicators of state (1) Logit Positive
(1990) NLSY females aged 14–15 out-of-wedlock birth by age welfare policy including significant
in 1979 (n=1,184) 19 the monthly AFDC benefit effect for
plus the value of food whites, no
stamps effect for
(2) Conditional probability (2) Discrete nonwhites
of having an out-of-wedlock hazard model




Study Data Set Unit of Observation Dependent Variables Independent Variables Technique Results
Duncan & 1968–85 Black teenagers Probability of an (1) Guarantee level for a Logit No effect
Hoffman PSID (n=874) out-of-wedlock birth family of two
(1990) associated with receipt
of AFDC
(2) Potential earned Significant
income at age twenty negative
effect
An, Haveman, 1987 PSID Unwed young women Probability of AFDC receipt Maximum AFDC benefit Bivariate probit No effect
& Wolfe (n=892) conditional on out-of-wedlock level for three kids and with sample
(1990) birth one adult selection
Lundberg 1979–86 Never-married, childless Had a premarital birth AFDC benefit level for one Nested logit Positive
& Plotnick NLSY women aged 14–16 in adult and three children significant





Hyatt & 1948–86 Canadian time-series Log of total fertility rate Annual family allowance OLS with IV Small
Milne Various (n=39) payments and child tax positive
(1991) Canadian credit effect
government
sources
Allen 1986 COC Low-income women Children born out of wedlock Welfare income, liquid Logit Significant





Study Data Set Unit of Observation Dependent Variables Independent Variables Technique Results
Murray 1954–88 States over time Illegitimacy ratio Average AFDC benefit level Bivariate Significant
(1993) DHHS and (n=1,014) (illegitimate births as a plus food stamp benefit correlations positive












Acs (1993) 1979–88 Women aged 14–16 in First and second births Maximum AFDC benefit Logit model Significant
NLSY 1979 (n=1,814) by age 23 (family of two for first for hazard effect on
births, family of three rates first births
for second births); extra for whites;
benefit for second birth no effect on
second
births
Acronymns: NCHS = National Center for Health Statistics; NORC-NY = National Opinion Research Center, New York data; DHEW = Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare; SAU = Statistical Areal Unit; SMSA = Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area; AL-CA = Alameda County, California, data;
NLSY = National Longitudinal Survey of Youth; PSID = Panel Study of Income Dynamics; IV = Instrumental Variable; SIE = Survey of Income and
Education; COC = Census of Canada.13
from Canada and found that government programs that reduced the cost of bearing a child had a small
positive effect on the total fertility rate. Finally, Murray (1993) used a time series of data on states
and examined bivariate correlations between AFDC plus food stamp income and the illegitimacy ratio
(the ratio of illegitimate births to all live births). He found a significant positive correlation for whites
but not for blacks. However, when he controlled for a measure of black population density, Murray
found a positive correlation for blacks.
In general, studies using micro data have also yielded mixed results. Placek and Hendershot
(1974) tested the Brood Sow hypothesis (the idea that women on welfare favor welfare status, are
extremely active sexually, do not use contraceptives, and want to become pregnant). Their study of
welfare mothers in Tennessee rejected the Brood Sow hypothesis. A study by Presser and Salsberg
(1975) found that women on welfare do not have a desire to have more children. In fact, they found
that participation in AFDC had a negative effect on the desire to have additional children. Ellwood
and Bane (1985) also found no effect using 1976 data from the Survey of Income and Education.
Numerous studies have used longitudinal data to determine the effects of welfare benefit
levels and other socioeconomic characteristics on the probability that young women will have an out-
of-wedlock birth and join the welfare ranks. The results of these studies have also been inconclusive.
Allen (1993), using Canadian data, found a significant positive effect. Gonul (1988), using data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), found a weak positive effect. Plotnick (1990),
Acs (1993), and Lundberg and Plotnick (1990), also using NLSY data, found a positive effect for
whites, but no effect for nonwhites. Duncan and Hoffman (1990) and An, Haveman, and Wolfe
(1990), using Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data, found no effect. Different models were
analyzed in each of these studies. Gonul (1988), Plotnick (1990), and Acs (1993) analyzed hazard
models; Plotnick also analyzed logit models, as did Duncan and Hoffman (1990) and Allen (1993);14
An, Haveman, and Wolfe (1990) analyzed a bivariate probit model with sample selection; and
Lundberg and Plotnick (1990) analyzed a nested logit model.
Only two studies (Keefe, 1983; Acs, 1993) directly tested the hypothesis that increases in
benefit differentials affect fertility decisions. Keefe (1983) analyzed a sample of over 3,100 AFDC
families in California before and after the 1970 California AFDC benefit level increase to determine if
the increase for additional children had an effect on fertility. Keefe found no evidence to support the
hypothesis. Acs (1993), using NLSY data, examined whether the additional benefit for a second child
influenced the probability of a second birth. Acs found no effect of either the basic benefit level or
the additional benefit for a second child on the probability of a second birth. Acs did not test the
hypothesis that the benefit differential might have an influence on first births.
In general, the results of previous studies have been mixed, but generally indicate no direct
relationship between AFDC benefit levels (or differentials) and family size. Small sample sizes have
plagued most of the analyses. In this study, we use a much larger sample and a somewhat different
methodology to analyze the relationship between the AFDC benefit structure and the childbearing
decisions of never-married women.
III. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The decision to have children is influenced by a large number of economic and noneconomic
factors. In the economics literature, modeling fertility decisions is a complex undertaking, particularly
when a life-cycle framework is used and when labor supply (and other behavior) is considered to be
jointly determined with fertility decisions. In principle, an economic model of fertility and labor
supply decisions could be used to predict the behavioral effects of economic factors. As discussed in
Blau and Robins (1989), in a standard model of fertility and labor supply behavior, the key economic15
variables are the wage rate and the "cost" of children (expenses incurred in bearing and raising
children).
Within this framework, AFDC benefit levels and differentials can be thought of as "subsidies"
that reduce the cost of children. In addition, AFDC benefit levels and differentials have a work
disincentive effect that reinforces their positive effect on fertility decisions, because a reduction in
labor supply reduces child care costs and hence reduces the cost of children.
A fully developed model of fertility and labor supply decisions is beyond the scope of this
paper. Our objective is to specify a tractable reduced form model that focuses on the effects of
economic variables on fertility decisions. In particular, we wish to determine whether AFDC benefit
levels and differentials influence family-size decisions and whether these effects vary by a number of
economic and demographic factors.
IV. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Data
The data used to estimate the effects of AFDC benefit levels and differentials on family size
are drawn from the March Current Population Survey (CPS) for the years 1980 through 1988. Each
March CPS contains demographic data for individuals at the time of the survey, and data on
employment and income for these individuals during the calendar year prior to the survey. The CPS
contains detailed responses to survey questions on the number and ages of children in the family, the
age of the individual, race/ethnicity, and the education, earnings, and nonwage income of each member
of the family.
The strategy adopted in this paper is to determine whether AFDC benefit levels and
differentials that existed prior to the birth of a woman’s first child are systematically related to the
number of children she has at the time of the survey.
6 Note how this strategy differs from that taken16
in some previous studies. Several previous studies examined the effects of current AFDC benefits on
family size at the time of the survey. However, these latter studies misspecify the AFDC benefit
variables because family-size decisions are presumably based on past, rather than present, AFDC
benefit levels. If benefit levels and differentials change over time in unanticipated ways, use of the
current values will result in a misspecified model.
Our approach is to create a series of cohorts, based on cross-sectional data, and to construct,
for each woman, variables based on the AFDC benefit levels that existed in her current state of
residence prior to the birth of her first child. For purposes of this paper, we use the benefit levels and
differentials in effect when the woman was eighteen years old. It should be noted that it would be
possible to define the AFDC benefit variables precisely before the birth of the first child for each
woman with children, because we know each woman’s age. However, as will be described below, we
include women without children in the sample and need to define a comparable set of AFDC benefit
variables for them in a way that will not bias the results. We can’t use current benefit levels for
women without children because that would generate systematic positive correlation between family
size and the benefit levels (the correlation would be positive because benefit levels have been falling
uniformly over the time period covered in our sample). While benefit levels and differentials
prevailing at age eighteen will be subsequent to the birth of the first child for many women, it should
be reasonably close to the values that were used in the decision-making process.
One might argue that using benefit levels in the woman’s current state of residence is not
correct and that benefit levels in the state she actually resided in at age eighteen would be theoretically
more appropriate. Of course, given the structure of the CPS, we do not know which state the woman
lived in at age eighteen. However, using the AFDC benefit levels in her current state of residence
may be theoretically justifiable because it incorporates any induced effects on migration for women
that originally resided in another state. Thus, we implicitly assume in our analysis that when the17
woman plans her fertility decisions, she bases it, in part, on the benefit structure in her future state of
residence.
7
The CPS does not contain marital history information. Thus, we restrict our analysis to the
sample of never-married women, to ensure that all sample members were categorically eligible for
AFDC benefits at the time their first child was born (only unmarried women are eligible for benefits
under the regular AFDC program).
8 Never-married mothers constitute almost one-half of the AFDC
caseload and are perhaps the group of greatest concern to policymakers. Theoretically, the same
woman could appear in our sample more than once (if she was interviewed in more than one survey
year), but family size, which is measured as of the date of the survey, could change over time.
To avoid possible selection biases, we include never-married women without children in the
sample and, like never-married women with children, we use AFDC benefit levels and differentials for
them that existed in their current state of residence at age eighteen. Thus our empirical model
captures the effects of AFDC benefit levels and differentials on both the probability of having children
and the number of children born for those with children.
9 The model takes advantage of state and
time variation in AFDC guarantee levels and differentials as a means of identifying their influence on
family size decisions.
We restrict our analysis to never-married women between the ages of eighteen and thirty at
the time of the survey. This is done for two reasons. First, we want a representative sample of
women during their primary childbearing years. Second, we are only able to collect AFDC benefit
levels by family size from 1968 to the present, so that women who were age thirty in 1980 were the
oldest for whom we could construct the AFDC benefit variables (they were age eighteen in 1968).
The resulting sample size is 74,355, of which 66,965 (90 percent) do not have children and 7,390 (10
percent) have one or more children. Table 4 shows the distribution of the sample with respect to
family size in the nine survey years covered in our analysis.18
TABLE 4
Distribution of the Sample, by Survey Year and Number of Children
Mean Number
Survey Number of Children All of Children
Year 0 12345 + Women per 1,000 Women
1980 7,871 423 209 73 26 14 8,616 144
1981 8,066 458 202 90 20 13 8,849 146
1982 7,360 416 222 87 26 11 8,122 158
1983 7,510 428 209 78 31 15 8,271 156
1984 7,436 479 212 79 29 10 8,245 159
1985 7,416 487 241 88 32 15 8,279 174
1986 7,128 458 266 89 33 16 7,990 184
1987 7,137 497 267 115 31 15 8,062 197
1988 7,041 467 239 116 39 19 7,921 196
All years 66,965 4,113 2,067 815 267 128 74,355 168
Source: Current Population Surveys, March 1980–March 1988.19
B. Econometric Specification
In our model, the dependent variable represents the number of children in the family and it is
measured as an integer that varies between zero and nine. To analyze the distribution of this variable,
we utilize the Poisson regression model, which is appropriate for models analyzing count data. The
econometric specification for the Poisson model is given by the following pair of equations:
where Ni is a discrete random variable representing the number of children in a family. Ni has
observed frequencies, ni. The vector of regressors (described below) is represented by xi.
It can be shown that li represents the mean and the variance of the Poisson distribution.
10 In
addition, the probability of having at least one child is given by 1-exp(-li), and the mean number of
children for those with children is given by li/(1-exp(-li)).
The Poisson model may not adequately describe the distribution of family size in our sample.
To test the robustness of our results to the distributional assumption, we estimate two additional
models. One is a simple ordinary least squares (OLS) model. The other is a probit model, in which
the dependent variable is equal to one if the woman has at least one child, and zero otherwise. Given
the definitions in the previous paragraph, the probit model results can be directly compared to the
Poisson model results.
C. Variables
All of the models reported in this paper include the following explanatory variables: dummy
variables for geographic region (NE, NC, WEST, SOUTH), dummy variables for race/ethnicity
(WHITE, BLACK, HISPANIC), the woman’s age at the time of the survey (AGE), dummy variables20
for whether the woman is a high school graduate (HS) or dropout (NHS),
11 the woman’s nonwage
income (PNONWAGE),
12 the effective AFDC tax rate on nonwage income in the current state of
residence at age eighteen (TAX),
13 and a series of dummy variables for each survey year (Y81 to
Y88, omitting Y80).
14
For all women in the sample, an average guarantee level differential is calculated for the year
the woman reached age eighteen. The guarantee level differential is measured as the average
difference between the guarantee level for three children and the guarantee level for one child in the
relevant current state of residence (G31).
15 The differential is measured in real 1991 dollars. In
addition to the average differential variable (G31), the guarantee level for one child (G1) is included to
capture state differences in the basic level of AFDC benefits.
16 Interaction variables are also included
in some specifications to allow for different effects by race/ethnicity, whether or not the woman
finished high school, and her age. Significance tests are performed for each set of interactions.
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Table 5 presents the empirical results for the AFDC guarantee variables for the three models
(Poisson, OLS, and probit). The full set of parameter estimates for the models without any interaction
terms is presented in the appendix.
The results from the base model (no interaction terms) suggest that the differential for
additional children does not significantly influence childbearing decisions of never-married women. In
fact, the coefficient of the differential variable is negative in every model. The results do indicate,
however, that childbearing decisions are influenced by the basic benefit level. In the Poisson model,
the coefficient implies an elasticity for the basic benefit level of .135 (.00031*434.32). A comparison
of the Poisson and probit results reveals that the basic benefit level mainly affects the probability of21
TABLE 5
Empirical Results for the Effects of AFDC Benefits on Family Size
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)
OLS Poisson Probit
No Interaction Terms
G31 -.000087 -.00021 -.00032
(.00011) (.00047) (.00036)
G1 .000053** .00030*** .00040***
(.000024) (.00011) (.000082)
Race/Ethnicity Interactions
WHITE*G31 -.00054*** -.0015** -.0011***
(.00012) (.00071) (.00043)
WHITE*G1 -.000033 .00042*** .00024**
(.000026) (.00016) (.000096)
BLACK*G31 .00034 -.000078 .00072
(.00030) (.00068) (.00075)
BLACK*G1 .00032*** -.000093 .00031*
(.000065) (.00015) (.00017)
HISPANIC*G31 .0017*** .0019 -.00074
(.00046) (.0013) (.0013)
HISPANIC*G1 .00018* .00091*** .0013***
(.00010) (.00030) (.00028)
Test statistic F = 130.7*** c




NHS*G31 .0022*** .00049 .00092
(.00027) (.00072) (.00076)
NHS*G1 .00022*** .00049*** .00075***
(.000059) (.00016) (.00016)
HS*G31 -.00048*** -.00075 -.00072*
(.00011) (.00058) (.00040)
HS*G1 .000010 .00013 .00027***
(.000025) (.00013) (.000092)
Test statistic F = 285.1*** c






Race/Ethnicity and Education Interactions
WHITE*G31*NHS 0.00024 0.0014 0.00052
(0.00033) (0.0012) (0.00094)
WHITE*G1*NHS 0.00014** 0.00088*** 0.00060***
(0.000070) (0.00026) (0.00020)
BLACK*G31*NHS 0.00079 -0.0021** 0.00017
(0.00057) (0.0010) (0.0014)
BLACK*G1*NHS 0.0010*** 0.00016 0.00047
(0.00013) (0.00022) (0.00031)
HISPANIC*G31*NHS 0.0068*** 0.0058*** 0.0035*
(0.00078) (0.0016) (0.0020)
HISPANIC*G1*NHS -0.00044** 0.00015 0.00068
(0.00018) (0.00037) (0.00045)
WHITE*G31*HS -0.00069*** -0.0022*** -0.0014***
(0.00012) (0.00085) (0.00048)
WHITE*G1*HS -0.000061** 0.00026 0.00015
(0.000027) (0.00019) (0.00011)
BLACK*G31*HS 0.00041 0.00096 0.00072
(0.00034) (0.00087) (0.00085)
BLACK*G1*HS 0.000048 -0.00029 0.00022
(0.000075) (0.00020) (0.00019)
HISPANIC*G31*HS -0.00068 -0.0046** -0.0037**
(0.00054) (0.0020) (0.0016)
HISPANIC*G1*HS 0.00042*** 0.0020*** 0.0017***
(0.00012) (0.00045) (0.00037)





G31 .00016 .00077 -.0021
(.00063) (.0032) (.0023)
G1 .00023 .0012* .0017***
(.00014) (.00069) (.00049)
AGE*G31 -.000011 -.000038 .000070
(.000026) (.00012) (.000089)
AGE*G1 -.0000077 -.000035 -.000054***
(.0000058) (.000026) (.000020)
Test statistic F = 3.8** c
2 = 9.4*** c
2= 13.9***
for interactions
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Current Population Surveys, March 1980–March 1988.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.23
having at least one child; it does not appear to affect the number of children for women who already
have children.
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For all three models, the test statistic indicates that the effects of the AFDC benefit variables
differ by race/ethnicity. In the Poisson model, the differential is significantly negative for whites,
insignificantly negative for blacks, and insignificantly positive for Hispanics. The basic benefit level is
significantly positive for whites (with an elasticity of .197), insignificantly negative for blacks
(although it is significantly positive in the OLS model), and significantly positive for Hispanics (with
an elasticity of .422). The effect for whites is consistent with the findings of Freshcock and Cutright
(1979), Plotnick (1990), and Lundberg and Plotnick (1990), but the effect for Hispanics is not. Thus,
our results for the Poisson model imply that the basic benefit level is exerting a significant influence
on family-size decisions of whites and Hispanics, but not of blacks. Our results for the probit model,
on the other hand, imply that the basic benefit level is exerting a significant influence on the decision
of whether or not to have children for all three racial/ethnic groups.
The test statistics also indicate that the effects of the AFDC benefit variables are different for
high school dropouts and graduates. In the OLS model, both the differential and the basic benefit
level have a significant positive effect on family size for high school dropouts (about 17 percent of the
women in our sample reported that they did not finish high school). For high school graduates, the
differential has a significant negative effect and the basic benefit level has an insignificant positive
effect.
In the Poisson and probit models, the effect of the differential is not statistically significant for
high school dropouts and is negative and statistically significant for high school graduates. Generally,
the directions of the effects are the same as those in the OLS model. The effect of the basic benefit
level for dropouts is significantly positive in all three models, while for high school graduates it is
statistically significant only in the probit model. In the Poisson model, the elasticity of the basic
benefit level for dropouts is .223, while for graduates it is .065 (but not statistically significant). For24
the differential, the elasticity for dropouts is .047, a very small effect that is also not statistically
significant.
To determine whether the effects of educational attainment on family size differ by
race/ethnicity, the race/ethnicity and education variables are interacted with the differential and basic
benefit level variables. Once again the test statistics indicate that the interactions are statistically
significant. The Poisson results suggest a significantly positive effect of the differential for Hispanic
high school dropouts, but not for white or black high school dropouts (the effect is significantly
negative for black high school dropouts). In the case of the basic AFDC benefit level, the effect is
significantly positive for white dropouts (with an elasticity of .392), but not for black or Hispanic
dropouts. The effect of the basic benefit level is significantly positive, however, for Hispanic
graduates, with an elasticity of .204.
The final set of interactions we tested for was age of the woman. The age interactions are
jointly statistically significant in all three models, but the test statistics are not as large as they are for
the other interactions and only one of the individual interaction terms is statistically significant
(AGE*G1). The results show no significant variation in the effect of the differential with age, but do
show a significant effect of the basic benefit level with age in the probit model. The results imply that
the effect of the basic benefit level on family-size decisions is strongest for younger women. Since
the age variable is measured as of the date of the survey, this result suggests that the effects of the
basic benefit level have been increasing over time.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Using a much larger sample than has been used in previous studies, we have been able to
obtain more precise estimates of the influence of AFDC benefit levels and differentials on family-size
decisions of never-married women. Our estimates of a Poisson regression model suggest that the basic
AFDC benefit level for a family of two (one adult and one child) exerts a significant influence on the25
family-size decisions of white and Hispanic women, but not on those of black women. We also find
that the additional benefits for larger families do not appear to be exerting an overall effect on family
size, suggesting that eliminating benefit differentials for larger families will not influence family-size
decisions.
When the AFDC benefit variables are interacted with the educational attainment of the
woman, a number of significant positive effects of both the basic benefit level and the incremental
benefit for larger families are found for high school dropouts. For high school graduates, the effects
are generally smaller in magnitude than for high school dropouts, and the effects of the benefit
differentials for high school graduates are generally negative. These results suggest that cutting
welfare benefits for larger families, as some states are now doing, may be a misguided policy; a better
strategy might be to alter the benefit structure in such a way as to encourage single mothers to
complete high school. Such a strategy would give single mothers better labor market opportunities,
which in turn might discourage nonmarital births and encourage greater self-sufficiency through
employment. It should be noted, however, that being a high school dropout might be a proxy for
some other underlying characteristic of the woman and that inducing women to complete high school
who otherwise would not might have no effect whatsoever on nonmarital births. On the other hand,
there might be a direct causal relationship between completion of high school and these other factors
that lead to nonmarital births.
Some states seem to be recognizing the importance of completing high school on reducing
welfare dependency. A recent program put into effect in Ohio called LEAP (Learning, Earning, And
Parenting) provides an incentive for welfare mothers to complete high school by giving them an extra
$62 (or 22 percent) in additional benefits for every month they stay in school and by cutting benefits by
$62 for every month they do not stay in school.
18 Our analysis of CPS data suggests that this
approach might be a more desirable social policy than simply cutting the benefits of welfare mothers
who have additional children.2627
APPENDIX
Full Results
(Base Model with No Interaction Terms)
OLS Poisson Probit Means
Intercept -0.35*** -5.08*** -2.90*** --
(0.046) (0.16) (0.14)
NE 0.048*** 0.20*** 0.097*** 0.25
(0.0080) (0.037) (0.028) (.43)
NC 0.077*** 0.37*** 0.19*** 0.24
(0.0072) (0.031) (0.025) (0.43)
WEST 0.043*** 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.24
(0.0078) (0.036) (0.028) (0.43)
BLACK 0.41*** 1.72*** 1.03*** 0.16
(0.0058) (0.022) (0.017) (0.37)
HISPANIC 0.18*** 1.14*** 0.53*** 0.10
(0.0070) (0.028) (0.021) (0.30)
AGE 0.031*** 0.14*** 0.078*** 22.12
(0.00083) (0.0036) (0.0028) (3.39)
PNONWAGE -0.0000028*** -0.000046*** -0.000020*** 422.10
(0.00000085) (0.0000079) (0.0000048) (2353.5)
FS31 -.00014 -.0066* -.0082** 75.99
(.0012) (.0040) (.0036) (3.70)
FS1 -.00018 .0026* .0025* 185.65
(.00046) (.0015) (.0014) (9.68)
TAX -0.061*** -0.45*** -0.30*** 0.40
(0.015) (0.075) (0.056) (0.19)
HS -0.31*** -1.16*** -0.73*** 0.83
(0.0055) (0.019) (0.017) (0.38)
Y81 -0.00010 0.033 0.027 0.12
(0.0083) (0.040) (0.030) (0.32)
Y82 0.011 0.090** 0.059** 0.11
(0.0085) (0.041) (0.031) (0.31)
Y83 0.0084 0.071* 0.049 0.11
(0.0087) (0.042) (0.031) (0.31)
Y84 0.012 0.082* 0.098*** 0.11
(0.0089) (0.043) (0.032) (0.31)
Y85 0.023** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.11
(0.0091) (0.042) (0.032) (0.31)
Y86 0.035*** 0.23*** 0.18*** 0.11
(0.0094) (0.043) (0.033) (0.31)
Y87 0.045*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.11
(0.0095) (0.043) (0.033) (0.31)
Y88 0.045*** 0.27*** 0.20*** 0.11
(0.0097) (0.044) (0.034) (0.31)
G31 -0.000087 -0.00021 -0.00032 100.63
(0.00011) (0.00047) (0.00036) (36.53)
(table continues)28
APPENDIX, continued
OLS Poisson Probit Means
G1 0.000053** 0.00030*** 0.00040*** 434.32
(0.000024) (0.00011) (0.000082) (169.46)
Log likelihood -30472.11 -19568.04
Adj R
2 .146
Mean of dependent 0.1677 0.1677 0.0994
variable (0.5906) (0.5906) (0.2992)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Current Population Surveys, March 1980–March 1988.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.29
Notes
1It should be noted that the proportion of all women who are unmarried has been increasing since
1965 (from 30 percent to 39 percent in 1989) and that the rising trend in nonmarital births over this
period may be partially reflecting a higher birthrate among women who would have been previously
married.
2The differential increases somewhat less than proportionately for larger families. For example, in
1991, the benefit for a family with five children was roughly 30 percent higher than the benefit for a
family with three children.
3See, for example, Bassi et al. (1990) for a summary of studies of expenditures on children.
4On November 1, 1992, New Jersey enacted a law in which a welfare recipient with two children
who has a child at least ten months after enrolling in AFDC will no longer receive the usual $64
increase in benefits. In California, a proposed law will also eliminate benefit increases. The family
would have to be off AFDC for twenty-four consecutive months before they would be eligible for a
cash grant increase for additional children. Other states having similar proposals are Arkansas,
Wisconsin, Connecticut, Florida, and Georgia. Additionally, Maryland’s governor has proposed
offering free contraceptives to women on welfare; the birthrate in Baltimore among teenage girls is
triple the U.S. rate.
5Some of these studies, plus a few additional ones, are discussed in Hofferth (1987) and Murray
(1993).
6It is important to point out that we are not examining completed family size for all families.
Variation in family size in our sample arises through variation in the ages of the women in our
sample, variation in fertility decisions across individuals, and variation in fertility decisions over time.
7This may be an unduly restrictive assumption for an older woman with several children,
particularly if she moved several times between the birth of her first child and the survey year.30
8During our survey period, two-parent families in about half of the states were eligible for the
AFDC-UP (Unemployed Parent) program, but the eligibility criteria (unemployment of both heads)
was very restrictive and few two-parent families participated in the program.
9Because we restrict our analysis to a sample of never-married women, another possible selection
bias may be present in that the benefit levels and differentials would be influencing the decision to be
unmarried rather than the decision to have children, given that a woman is unmarried. Prior research
suggests, however, that welfare benefit levels are not systematically related to marital status decisions
(Moffitt, 1992). Nonetheless, a more complete analysis would incorporate marriage decisions along
with family-size decisions, but such an analysis is not possible with the CPS data because of the
absence of marital history information.
10A distribution with the mean equal to the variance may be an unduly restrictive assumption. The
negative binomial model, which allows the mean and variance to differ, is an attractive alternative to
the Poisson model. We utilized both specifications, but the parameter estimates from both were
virtually identical. For simplicity, we report the Poisson regression model results in this paper.
11The high school graduate variable is used as a proxy for the woman’s potential wage rate at age
eighteen. It should be a reasonable proxy for most sample members. Whether the mother is currently
a high school graduate will be a poor proxy for the potential wage rate at age eighteen in the cases of
women who obtained their high school diploma after age eighteen. Due to the structure of the CPS
questionnaire, the high school graduate variable is based on reported years of education rather than
whether a diploma was actually received.
12Nonwage income (PNONWAGE) is calculated by summing the individual’s reported values of
social security income, interest income, dividend income, rental income, and pension income. Public
assistance income is not included in nonwage income. This variable is expressed in 1991 dollars, and
is deflated using the Consumer Price Index.31
13We use the effective tax rates in the AFDC program reported in Fraker, Moffitt, and Wolf
(1985). Values are extrapolated for years not covered by their data.
14All models were estimated with and without the survey year dummies and the results are
available from the authors on request. Although the survey year dummies were often statistically
significant, the coefficients of the other variables were virtually unaffected.
15We had originally planned to use the average differential between one and five children, but
guarantee levels for four and five children were not available for the early years in our sample. We
estimated models using the actual average differential for one and five children for years we had this
information and an extrapolated differential for one and five children for the other years. The results,
which are available on request from the authors, produced results similar to those reported in the text.
This is mainly because the differentials remain close to proportionate for more than three children.
16Murray (1993) used the combination of AFDC and food stamps benefits as a more
comprehensive measure of welfare income. All models reported in this paper were estimated using a
measure of food stamp income in addition to AFDC income. Two specifications were tested: (1) a
model with a separate variable for the food stamp basic benefit level for a family with one child (FS1)
plus the average food stamp differential for families with one and three children (FS31), and (2) a
model with the food stamp basic benefit level and differential added to the AFDC basic benefit level
and differential. Only the results from the first specification are reported here; the results from the
second specification are available on request from the authors. The results including the food stamp
variables were virtually identical to the results using the AFDC variables only. The food stamp data
were obtained from D. H. Moritz of the Food and Nutrition Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture.
The food stamp benefit levels were deflated by both the overall CPI and by the food component of the
CPI; the results were insensitive to which deflator was used.32
17We also estimated the OLS and Poisson models using only the sample of women with children.
Although potentially subject to selectivity biases, the results confirmed that the effect of the basic
benefit level is operating primarily on the probability of having at least one child and not on the
number of children for those with children. In fact, in the Poisson model on the restricted sample of
women with children, the effect of the basic benefit level on family size is negative and statistically
significant. The effect of the differential is not statistically significant in any model.
18See Bloom et al. (1993) for a discussion of the LEAP program and its impacts on school
attendance during the first three years of the program.33
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